Abstract-In this paper, we propose privacy-preserving route reporting schemes for traffic management for both infrastructuresupported and self-organizing vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Using only pseudonyms and anonymous authentication to conceal the real identity of the drivers cannot fully preserve the drivers' privacy because the reported future positions can be used to link pseudonyms and identify the drivers, e.g., from the locations they visit. Motivated by the fact that traffic management systems do not need to know the vehicles' individual routes and the total number of vehicles in each road segment would suffice, the proposed schemes aggregate the vehicles' routes. Countering the collusion attacks is usually hard, particularly in a self-organizing setting. The concept we use to mitigate the attack is that one vehicle is not trusted to run the scheme because it can be curious to know the drivers' routes, but these schemes are run by multiple vehicles. Our ns-2 simulation results and analysis have demonstrated that our schemes can preserve the drivers' privacy with acceptable overhead.
systems provide information on the current traffic situations and cannot predict future traffic conditions. This would not help drivers who are already stuck in congested traffic because they may not be able to find alternative routes. Therefore, recent research has focused on avoiding the occurrence of traffic buildup as a better means for smoothening traffic flow [5] , [6] . This approach requires each driver to report the future locations (route). After collecting this information, slow traffic and congestions can be predicted, and drivers can autonomously change their routes to avoid potentially congested areas. However, knowing the current and future locations of vehicles can be misused by attackers to not only violate people's location privacy but can be used for physical attacks and robbery as well.
Pseudonyms and anonymous authentication [7] , [8] could preserve location privacy as long as the attackers cannot link pseudonyms, i.e., when one vehicle changes its pseudonym, whereas the other vehicles do not. To prevent linking pseudonyms, techniques such as silent period [9] and mix zone [10] are developed to let the vehicles change pseudonyms simultaneously. However, since traffic management requires reporting future locations, the existing privacy-preserving schemes are no longer secured because the reported information can be used to link pseudonyms. To illustrate, let us consider the scenario in Fig. 1 . Although vehicles A and B change pseudonyms simultaneously after a silence period, the attackers can make use of the reported future locations to link pseudonyms, i.e., to know that {A, A } and {B, B } are for the same vehicle. By linking pseudonyms, the complete trip route can be reconstructed, and the driver can most likely be identified, e.g., from the locations the vehicle visits. Therefore, preserving privacy, assuming that attackers know the future location, is a new problem that needs 0018-9545 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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to be studied. New approaches are needed to release enough information to run the traffic management systems without violating the drivers' privacy. Our proposed schemes fill this technical gap. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving route reporting scheme for traffic management using VANETs. Two variants of our scheme are proposed to suit the cases where the VANET formation and management is supported by roadside units (RSUs) and where no infrastructure is provided and the VANET has to self-organize. Since the traffic management systems in essence do not need to know the vehicles' individual routes and only care for the total number of vehicles in each road segment, the proposed schemes aggregate vehicles' routes instead. Using aggregation hides information that could uncover the driver's identity and travel path and releases the least, yet sufficient, information for the traffic management systems to be effective. The first variant of our scheme is called Privacypreserving Route reporting for Infrastructure-Based VANETs (PRIB). In PRIB, each vehicle encrypts its route using homomorphic encryption. Then, it sends the ciphertext to an RSU that aggregates the vehicles' routes and sends an aggregated ciphertext to the traffic management center (TMC). The TMC decrypts the ciphertext and uses the total number of vehicles in each segment to compile traffic guidance reports and send them to the vehicles.
Then, we propose two variants for self-organizing VANETs, namely, Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) Point-additionbased route sharing scheme for Self-Organizing VANETs (EPSO) and Homomorphic Encryption-based route sharing scheme for Self-Organizing vehicles (HESO). Countering the collusion attacks is usually challenging and hard, particularly in self-organizing setting and in the absence of trusted entities. The concept we use to secure our schemes against collusion attacks is that one vehicle is not trusted to run the scheme because it can be curious to know the drivers' routes, but the scheme should be run by multiple vehicles.
In the EPSO scheme, a platoon of vehicles forms a ring, and each vehicle shares keys with neighboring vehicles. The shared keys are used to obfuscate routes. After receiving a packet, the vehicle adds its route, removes the shared key(s) with the preceding vehicle(s), and adds the shared key(s) with the next vehicle(s) to the packet and relay it to the next vehicle in the ring. The last vehicle in the ring is able to recover the total number of vehicles in each segment by removing all the keys. ECC point addition is used to add and remove the keys to the route. We have used an efficient key establishment scheme to enable vehicles to share keys by knowing only their pseudonyms and without exchanging packets.
The HESO scheme uses homomorphic encryption and does not need sharing keys. A vehicle, called leader, sends a request to create a platoon of vehicles. The scheme is run by the leader and other vehicles called subleaders. The leader and the subleaders create homomorphic encryption's public/private key pairs and announce the public keys. First, each vehicle masks its route by adding a secret random value, encrypts the message with the leader's public key, and sends the ciphertext to the leader. Second, each vehicle in the platoon subtracts the same random number from the route, encrypts the result, and sends the ciphertext to the subleader. The leader and subleader aggregate the packets and then decrypt the aggregated packet. Finally, they exchange the results of the decryption to extract the aggregated routes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We explain the network and threat models in Section II followed by preliminaries in Section III. In Section IV, we describe our infrastructure-based route reporting scheme. Then, we present the two schemes for self-organizing VANETs in Section V. Performance evaluations and privacy preservation analysis are provided in Sections VI and VII, respectively. The related work is covered in Section VIII. Finally, Section IX concludes this paper.
II. NETWORK AND THREAT MODELS

A. Network Model
As shown in Fig. 2 , the considered network model for infrastructure-based scheme has the following entities.
• Vehicles: Vehicles communicate with each other and with RSUs that are deployed along the roads. They are able to store cryptographic credentials and run cryptographic algorithms. Vehicles use the location information to determine the road segments that are in their routes.
• RSUs: RSUs are access points that are deployed on the roads by a trusted agency such as the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). They are connected to the TMC via fast communication technology, e.g., wired cables, 4G, or WiMAX.
• TMC: Each TMC is responsible for monitoring the traffic in a number of segments and is connected to the group of RSUs that covers these segments. It can also receive traffic information from other TMCs. After processing the traffic information, the TMC sends the expected traffic map to the vehicles.
• DMV: DMV is a centralized agency that is responsible for the periodic registration of vehicles and deployment of RSUs. It is also responsible for issuing digitally certified pseudonyms to vehicles and revoking them. During periodic registration, vehicles receive pseudonyms from the DMV, which should be sufficient to be used until the next registration.
For the self-organized VANET, there are no RSUs and TMCs. The traffic management is self-organized by a number of vehicles that travel in a certain area. In this case, the vehicles still need to use the credentials received from the DMV for anonymous authentication and key management.
B. Adversary and Threat Model
The DMV is fully trusted because it is operated by the government. Because they are unattended, the RSUs may be illegally accessed by adversaries who want to know the locations of the vehicles. Thus, RSUs should not be able to uncover the real identities of the vehicles or the routes they plan to travel. A vehicle or an eavesdropper may also try to know the real identities and routes of other vehicles. We assume that the attackers are honest but curious, i.e., do not aim to disrupt the communications but they are curious to know private information.
If some vehicles collude with an RSU to reveal a target vehicle's route, they should not be able to know its route. Collusion between vehicles should not also reveal the routes of a target vehicle. The TMC is not trusted, but it does not collude with RSUs and vehicles because it is managed and operated by the DMV. Since the DMV is a trusted authority, it does not collude with the RSUs and the vehicles. Moreover, addressing collusion attacks in self-organizing VANETs is challenging because vehicles collect future routes independently without relying on any infrastructure. The concept we use is that to reveal the route of a target vehicle, a number of vehicles should collude, and more protection against collusion attack can be realized by increasing this number. The collusion of a large number of vehicles can be assumed less likely than the collusion of a small number of vehicles.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Here, we introduce the pairing-based cryptography [11] and the homomorphic encryption [12] , which are the foundations of our proposed schemes.
A. Bilinear Pairings
Let G A be a cyclic additive group with generator P and order k, and G M be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G A × G A → G M with the following properties.
• Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab ∈ G M , where P and Q ∈ G A and a and b ∈ Z * k .
• Nondegenerate: There exists P and Q ∈ G A such that e(P, Q) = 1.
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P , Q ∈ G A .
B. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of public key encryption where arithmetic operations, such as addition and multiplica- tion, can be performed on encrypted data without decrypting the ciphertext. The simplest form of the homomorphic encryption can be explained as follows:
In our schemes, we use the Paillier cryptosystem to achieve the homomorphic property. See [13] for more details on keys generation, encryption, and decryption of the Paillier cryptosystem.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ROUTE REPORTING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE-BASED VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS
A. System Initialization
The DMV divides the roads into segments and gives a unique identifier for each segment. The identifier can be derived from the segment coordinates and the road name. For every registered vehicle, the DMV generates a group of certified public/ private key pairs as follows {x 0 and Y r = x r P . Each TMC generates public key pair (n, g) and the corresponding private key (λ). It keeps λ secret and publishes the public parameters n and g.
B. Route Request and Route Reporting
The exchanged packets in PRIB are shown in Fig. 3 . As shown in the figure, the RSU starts the scheme by sending a route request packet. The packet has the list of road segments L s for which the RSU inquires whether the drivers will drive on them, the current timestamp T S, RSU's unique identifier R id , and the signature α r = x r H(L s T S R id ). The timestamp is used to thwart packet replay attacks where attackers replay old packets at different location or time, e.g., replaying old packets can cause collisions at the mediumaccess-control layer, which consequently degrades the throughput. Then, the RSU broadcasts L s T S R id α r to all passing vehicles in its communication range. After receiving the route request packet, the vehicles verify the signature by examining
If the verification passes, each vehicle should report its route as shown in Fig. 3 . The format of the route is expressed as
where S * (v) ∈ {000, 001} assuming three bits are assigned for each segment. S i (v) is 001 if the segment i is in the vehicle's route; otherwise, it is 000. For instance, if a route is "000 001 001 000 001," this means that the vehicle will drive on segments numbers 1, 2, and 4. Vehicles should encrypt their routes using a homomorphic encryption scheme to preserve their privacy. Vehicle v selects a random number r v and computes its encrypted route
Then, the vehicle signs C v after appending a timestamp by computing
The vehicle sends back to the RSU the following packet C v T S α v . The RSU verifies the freshness of the packets; the difference between the timestamp of the route request packet and that of the route report packet should be within a certain range. Certainly, stale packets should be dropped.
C. Aggregated Routes
After sending the route request packet, the RSU has to wait for a certain amount of time or a certain number of received routes μ. Then, the RSU verifies the vehicles' signatures, aggregates the routes, and sends the aggregated routes to the TMC. Signing the routes and verifying them are important to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the routes and to protect against forgery attack. To verify the routes' signatures with less overhead (fewer number of pairing operations), batch verification technique [14] can be used. In this technique, instead of verifying μ individual signatures, the signatures can be batched and one verification process is executed. The signatures are valid if e(P,
The proof for this is as follows:
To preserve the drivers' privacy, the RSU aggregates the vehicles' routes and sends the aggregated route to the TMC. The TMC can know the total number of vehicles that will drive in each road segment, but it cannot know the individual routes of the vehicles. The RSU aggregates the encrypted routes by computing C as follows:
To clarify how routes are aggregated, Fig. 4 gives an example for the aggregation of four routes. The RSU receives the encryption of four routes {R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , R 4 }, each route has four segments, and each segment is represented by three bits. After aggregating the ciphertexts, the resultant ciphertext is the encryption of 4 i=1 R i . The RSU signs the aggregated encrypted routes after attaching the current timestamp using its private key x r . Then, it sends the following packet to the TMC: C T S R id α r , where α r = x r H(C T S R id ). Each segment is assigned a predefined number of bits that depend on the maximum number of reporting vehicles. If a surge in the number of vehicles happens, an arithmetic overflow will be experienced when summing at the RSU. To elaborate, if we assign n bits for each segment, then the maximum number of vehicle routes to be added without problems should be 2 n − 1. If the number of vehicles that will drive in a certain segment exceeds 2 n − 1, a carry is generated and added to the number of vehicles in the next segment, which causes a mistake in the number of vehicles. To avoid such an arithmetic overflow problem, RSUs should make sure that the number of vehicles' routes it aggregates is less than 2 n − 1. If the number is greater than 2 n − 1 (i.e., can cause overflow), then the RSU should aggregate them in more than one message that are free of overflow. For example, if three bits are assigned to each segment, the maximum number of routes that can be aggregated without overflow is seven. If ten vehicles report traveling the same segment, to avoid causing carry, the RSU sends two messages to the TMC: one message with seven aggregated routes, and the other is for three routes. 
D. Traffic Guidance
When a signed aggregated route packet is received by the TMC, it first checks the timestamp and then verifies the signature by examining e(P, α r )
Using the expected number of vehicles in each segment and traffic condition information received from other TMCs, the TMC composes and sends traffic guidance information to the RSU to broadcast it to the vehicles. Using this information, vehicles run a traffic management scheme to decide whether to stay in the same route or take alternating one, e.g., if the expected number of vehicles in a segment exceeds a limit, which is a prediction to slow traffic or congestion at this segment.
V. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ROUTE REPORTING FOR SELF-ORGANIZING VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS
In the early stages of VANET deployment, it is not expected that all roads will be equipped with RSUs. PRIB is not suitable for self-organizing VANETs because if a vehicle is selected to play the role of the TMC, it can decrypt the drivers' individual routes and defies the privacy preservation goal. The challenge is how a group of vehicles can collect routes, aggregate them, and then disseminate the aggregated routes without support from an infrastructure and with protection against collusion attacks. In other words, although the vehicles are not trusted, they should run the scheme and achieve a protection against collusion attacks. Countering collusion attacks is a real challenge and hard particularly in infrastructureless setting and absence of trusted entities. Obviously, one vehicle should not have enough privilege to know a vehicle's route, but the scheme should have K protection level against collusion attack. This means at least K vehicles should collude to be able to know the route of another. Here, we present two privacy-preserving route reporting schemes for self-organizing VANETs.
A. ECC Point-Addition-Based Scheme
In this scheme, vehicles form platoons and traffic routes are aggregated for each platoon. See [15] and [16] for more information about how vehicles form and manage platoons. Each vehicle needs to share secret keys with some (or all) vehicles in its platoon. We use a bilinear-pairing-based key exchange protocol because it can establish keys efficiently. Any two vehicles can independently compute a shared secret key by just knowing each others' pseudonyms and without exchanging packets. DSRC [17] specifies that vehicles announce their locations by periodically sending beacon packets. Pseudonyms are used to hide the identity of vehicles reporting their location and can be extracted from beacon packets. The shared keys are used to mask the routes so that the attackers cannot know the vehicles' individual routes as they are aggregated, but all masks can be removed after aggregating all the routes. 2) Scheme Description: A platoon's vehicles create a ring, and each vehicle computes shared secret keys with its neighbors in the ring. Two vehicles A and B with pseudonyms ID a and ID b can independently compute a secret key (H(ID a ), S b ) ) without exchanging messages. The proof that the two keys are similar is as follows:
The basic idea of the EPSO scheme is depicted in Fig. 5 . Fig. 5 (a) depicts a setting with a minimum protection level against collusion attacks, whereas Fig. 5 (b) depicts a setting with the highest protection level against collusion attacks. In Fig. 5(a) , each vehicle shares two pairwise keys with two vehicles. The scheme starts at vehicle A that sends its route masked by the two keys shared with the previous vehicle E and the next vehicle B. After receiving a packet, each vehicle adds its route, removes the shared key with the previous vehicle, and adds the shared key with the next vehicle in the ring. Finally, when the packet arrives to vehicle E, it can recover the aggregated routes by removing the two masks K AE and K DE . We would like to point out that given aP and P , it is infeasible to compute a if it is large enough, but a can be computed if it is small. That is why given P and (
In the setting shown in Fig. 5(a) , if two vehicles collude, they can extract a victim vehicle's route. Fig. 5 (b) depicts another setting that is more resilient to collusion attack. The main idea is that each vehicle should mask its route with a larger number of keys. In Fig. 5(b) , each vehicles shares a key with each other vehicle in the ring. The scheme starts at vehicle A that sends its route masked with the keys shared with all other vehicles. After receiving a packet, each vehicle adds its route, removes the shared keys with the previous vehicles, and adds the shared keys with the next vehicles. Finally, when the packet arrives to vehicle E, it can extract the aggregated routes. This setting can achieve the maximum protection level against collusion attacks because all the vehicles should collude to extract a victim vehicle's route. For example, the route of vehicle A can only be extracted from its packet if the four keys shared with the other four vehicles are known.
B. Homomorphic-Encryption-Based Scheme 1) System Initialization:
For every registered vehicle, the DMV generates a group of certified public/private key pairs {x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n } and {Y 0 , Y 1 , . . . , Y n }. The private key x i is a random element ∈ Z * k , and the public key is Y i = x i P for i = {0, 1, . . . , n}. k is a large prime number, and P is the generator of a cyclic additive group G A . Similar to the PRIB scheme, these credentials are used for anonymous authentication. Each vehicle should be able to generate homomorphic encryption private/public key pairs, and encrypt and decrypt using a homomorphic encryption scheme [12] .
2) Scheme Description: Each group of vehicles forms a platoon and each platoon has a leader vehicle and one or more subleaders vehicle. Fig. 6 presents the case of one subleader, and Fig. 7 presents the case of multiple subleaders. More than one leader is necessary to protect against collusion attacks. The leader and each subleader should create a homomorphic encryption public and private key pair. The leader's public key is the pair n l and g l , and the private key is λ l . The subleader's public key is the pair n 2 and g 2 , and the private key is λ 2 . They should keep the private key secret but publicize the public key to the platoon vehicles. As shown in Fig. 6 , each vehicle should report its route twice to the leader and the subleader. First, each vehicle i chooses a random secret number s i to mask its route (R i ). No one can know this secret number except vehicle i. Then, it uses the public key of the leader's homomorphic encryption (n l and g l ) and a random number r i ∈ Z * n to compute C i = g
, which is the encryption of R i + s i . The vehicle sends C i to the leader. The leader can decrypt this ciphertext but cannot extract the vehicle's route without knowing the secret number s i . After the n vehicles in the platoon report their routes, the leader should aggregate the ciphertexts as follows:
The leader should use its private key (λ l ) to decrypt C T and
Each vehicle i encrypts R i − s i using the public key of the subleader's homomorphic encryption (n 2 , g 2 ) and sends the ciphertext to the subleader. The subleader aggregates the ciphertexts and decrypts the aggregation to obtain
s i to the leader to be able to compute the aggregated routes as follows:
It is obvious that neither the leader nor the subleader can extract the route of any vehicle because they do not know the secret number s i , but they can extract the route if they collude. In this case, they decrypt the ciphertexts of the victim vehicle to obtain R i + s i and R i − s i and then compute the vehicle's route as follows:
However, HESO can be more resilient to collusion attacks by including more subleaders. This is because to reveal the route of a driver, all the subleaders and the leader should collude together. Obviously, the more the number of subleaders is, the harder the collusion attack becomes. Fig. 7 gives another setting that is more resilient to collusion attacks. In this setting, there is one leader and four subleaders. The leader and each subleader should compute homomorphic encryption public and private keys and publicize the public keys. Each vehicle i should report its route to the leader and each subleader. As shown in the figure, the route that is reported to the leader is masked by the random numbers s 1,1 , and the route that is reported to the subleader 1 is masked by the random numbers s 1,2 , and so on. To be able to recover the aggregated routes,
After receiving all the reports from all vehicles in the platoon, the subleaders send the masked aggregated routes to the leader. The leader aggregate all the masked routes to cancel the masks and obtain the aggregated routes, as follows:
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
A. Communication Overhead
We assume that the average number of segments inquired by each RSU is 20, each segment identifier requires 5 B, and the timestamp requires 8 B. Our signature scheme uses elliptic curve cryptography that has smaller key sizes than the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) scheme for the same security level. The security strength of 224-bit key in ECC is equivalent to that of 2048-bit key in the RSA cryptosystem [18] . Using an elliptic curve additive group of order 224 bits, the signature's size is 56 B [19] . Using these numbers, we will calculate the packet size in our schemes.
In the infrastructure-based scheme, there are four transmissions: route request, route report, aggregated routes, and traffic guidance. The route request packet has the list of inquired segments, timestamp, and the RSU signature. The total packet size is 164 B. The size of the homomorphic encryption's ciphertext in Z * n 2 equals to double n. If we choose n to be 2048 bits, then the ciphertext size equals to 512 B. The route report packet has the homomorphic encryption, timestamp, and the vehicle's signature. The total packet size is 576 B. The aggregated routes packet has the aggregated ciphertext, timestamp, and the RSU's signature. The total packet size is 576 B.
In EPSO, the size of the one-time secret key is 28 B, assuming that the order of k is 224 bits. The route reporting packet has the vehicle's masked route, timestamp, and signature. The total size of the packet is 120 B.
In HESO, the size of the packet that is sent from the leader (or a subleader) to publicize the public keys is 164 B. The route reporting packet that should be sent to the leader and each subleader has the ciphertext of the vehicle's route, timestamp, and signature. The total size of the packet is 576 B.
B. Computation Overhead
We measured the computation time of the multiplication, pairing, and exponentiation operations using MIRACL cryptographic library [20] running on Intel(R) Core i7 CPU 2.00-GHz processor and 2-GB RAM. Our measurements indicate that the multiplication, exponentiation, and pairing operations take 0.65, 2.4, and 7 ms, respectively.
Using our measurements, the computation overhead of the infrastructure-based scheme is as follows.
Vehicles: Each vehicle should compute one exponential operation to encrypt a route and one multiplication operation to sign its route. The vehicle takes 3.05 ms to compose the route report packet.
RSU: RSUs verify a batch of μ signatures rather than verifying individual signatures. Batch and individual signature verifications require μ + 1 and 2μ pairing operations, respectively. The aggregation of the routes requires μ multiplication operations. Moreover, the signature of the aggregated encrypted routes requires one multiplication operation. Thus, to aggregate and sign 100 routes, for example, the RSU needs 707.65 ms.
TMC: TMCs verify the signature of RSUs by computing two pairing operations and decrypt the aggregated routes by computing one exponential operation. The signature of the traffic guidance sent from the TMC to the RSUs requires one multiplication operation. Thus, the TMC takes 14 ms to verify the signature, 2.4 ms to decrypt the aggregated routes, and 0.65 ms to sign the traffic guidance.
Meanwhile, in EPSO, the computation of each shared key needs one pairing operation and two hashing operations that takes 7 ms. If the EPSO's setting require j secret keys, the computation of the keys takes (7j) ms. The computation of the route reporting packet needs one multiplication operation for signature, one multiplication operation, and n + 1 addition operations, where n is the number of secret keys. In total, this computation takes 1.9 ms. Given the packet RP where R represents the aggregated number of vehicles and P is a generator of the group, it is feasible to recover the value R if the number of segments/the number of vehicles is small. The vehicle has to exhaustively try the values ofŔ such thatŔP = RP . If the value of R is too large, the computation needed to recover the routes can be large. HESO is used when the number of inquired segments/the number of reporting vehicles is expected to be large.
The computation overhead of the HESO scheme is as follows.
1) Leader/subleaders: The leader and each subleader should verify the vehicles' signatures sent in their route reports, aggregate routes, and decrypt the aggregated route. Using batch verification, the leader and each subleader need to perform (n − 1) pairing operations to verify the signatures, where n is the number of vehicles in the platoon. Aggregating the routes requires (n − 2) multiplication operations and decrypting the aggregated ciphertext needs one exponential operation, which requires 2.4 ms. 2) Other vehicles: To report its route, a vehicle needs 3.05 ms to perform one exponential operation and one multiplication operation to encrypt and sign its route. Since each vehicle should report its route to the leader and K subleaders, it needs 3.05 × (K + 1) ms.
C. NS-2 Experiment 1) Experiment Setup:
We simulated the proposed schemes using ns-2 simulator [21] to assess the network performance. The topography is generated using OpenStreetMap (OSM) project [22] , and vehicular movement traces are generated randomly using SUMO [23] . The simulated topography shown in Fig. 8 is about 2.4 km × 2.6 km area, which resembles an urban real-traffic environment located in downtown of Cairo, Egypt. We assumed that IEEE 802.11p is the underlying protocol that provides the communication among vehicles. The vehicles' transmission range is set to be 300 m. The vehicles run with different speeds with a maximum speed of 100 km/h. The vehicle's arrival rate follows a uniform distribution where one vehicle enters the simulation every 1 s. We study three traffic conditions with 110, 230, and 535 vehicles corresponding to low traffic, medium traffic, and congested traffic, respectively. The simulation focuses only on assessing the performance of the self-organizing schemes because, in the infrastructure-based scheme, most of the data transmissions are done by the RSU and the TMC that can be connected by wired connections that usually can provide more bandwidth than the wireless links of the self-organizing VANETs. The vehicles are divided into fixed-size platoons. The leaders/subleaders are selected randomly, and they are 5% of the total number of vehicles. Each vehicle can join only one platoon during the simulation time. In implementing our schemes in ns-2 simulation, we used the computation times and the packet sizes discussed in Section VI-A and B. The reported results are averaged over 20 different runs.
2) Simulation Results: In order to assess the network performance, we consider the following performance metrics.
• Average end-to-end packet delay: This is the average time a packet takes to reach its destination after it is sent. • Throughput: This is the average amount of data received by vehicles per second. • Participation ratio: This is the percentage of vehicles that joined a group and could stay connected to the group till receiving the final traffic report. It is possible that some vehicles do not meet leaders to join platoons. Fig. 9 shows the average packet delivery delay at different traffic conditions. It can be seen that the packet delay increases when the number of vehicles increases in EPSO and HESO schemes. This increase is mainly due to channel contention. It can also be seen that EPSO experiences less delay than HESO. This is because the vehicles perform ECC point addition to encrypt the route information in EPSO, which takes less computation time than the exponential operations needed in HESO.
Average packet delay:
Throughput: Fig. 10 gives the average throughput at different traffic conditions. It can be seen that the throughput increases with the increase in the number of vehicles in EPSO and HESO. This is very much expected because the number of transmissions increases as the vehicle population grows. It can also be seen that the throughput in the case of EPSO is less than that of HESO. This is due to two main reasons: 1) Unlike EPSO that requires reporting the route only once, vehicles should report routes at least twice to the leader and subleaders in HESO; and 2) the packet size to report routes in HESO is larger than that of the EPSO because HESO uses homomorphic encryption that needs more space than the ECC used in EPSO. The packet size in EPSO is about 180 B, whereas the packet size in HESO is 636 B.
Participation ratio: Fig. 11 gives the vehicles' participation ratio at different traffic conditions. It can be seen that the participation ratio is the same at different traffic conditions. This is because the number of leaders is 5% of the total number of vehicles; therefore the number of leaders increases with the increase in the number of vehicles. It can also be seen that the participation ratio is high in the two schemes, but the participation ratio in HESO is a little bit less than that of EPSO. This is because the execution of HESO takes more time than EPSO, and thus more vehicles may leave a platoon without receiving the traffic report.
VII. PRIVACY PRESERVATION ANALYSIS
Pseudonyms can effectively preserve the drivers' anonymity only if they cannot be linked. The vehicles' reported routes can be used in addition to other data such as vehicles' speed to link pseudonyms. By linking pseudonyms, the attacker can track vehicles and probably identify the drivers, e.g., from the locations they visit. In addition to pseudonyms, routes aggregation techniques are used in our proposed schemes to achieve a higher level of privacy by hiding the vehicles' individual routes while providing sufficient information to effectively conduct traffic management. We discuss the privacy preservation features provided by our schemes as follows.
Location privacy: Our schemes protect the location privacy of the drivers by aggregating the route reports. To elaborate, PRIB preserves the drivers' location privacy because the route reporting messages are encrypted by the TMC's public key and eavesdroppers and RSUs cannot decrypt them and uncover the individual routes. The TMC receives the aggregated routes and cannot know which vehicle is traveling on a certain road segment. In EPSO, it is infeasible to know the individual reported routes because vehicles mask them by adding secret keys. Given P and (R i + K AB )P , it is infeasible for an attacker to compute R i + K AB and know the route. A vehicle does not have enough privilege to remove the masks from the masked routes. In HESO, eavesdroppers and vehicles cannot find out the future routes of a certain driver because they do not have access to the private key needed to decrypt the encrypted routes. The leader/subleader can decrypt the ciphertext, but it cannot recover the route of a vehicle because each vehicle adds a random secret to its route before encryption.
Unlinkability of reported routes: Even if a driver reports the same route multiple times, an eavesdropper should not know that these reports are for the same vehicle. In PRIB and HESO, if a vehicle reports the same route multiple times at different occasions, the attacker cannot link the encrypted routes because the homomorphic encryption produces different ciphertexts for the same plaintexts due to using a random number in the encryption process. In EPSO, even if a vehicle reports the same route in different occasions, the packets look different because the keys used to mask the routes are used only for one time.
Mitigating collusion attacks: The concept we used to thwart collusion attacks is that one entity is not trusted to know the drivers' routes, but multiple entities should be able to compute the aggregated routes to run the traffic management system. Our proposed schemes ensure the separation of knowledge between different entities in the network. In PRIB, neither the TMCs nor the RSUs can know the individual vehicles' routes without collusion. The TMC can decrypt the total number of vehicles in each segment without knowing the individual routes. The RSUs cannot know the individual routes because they are encrypted by the TMC's public key.
In HESO, individual vehicles do not have enough privilege to remove the masks from the masked routes. To remove the masks, the leader needs to collude with the subleader(s). EPSO and HESO can be more resilient to collusion attacks by increasing the number of vehicles in the ring. In this case, a larger number of vehicles should collude to extract the routes of the targeted vehicle.
A secure algorithm should be used to generate good random numbers, and each random number should be used only once to make it hard to figure out any information about the routes by analyzing the statistics of the masked routes. Since the statistical difference depends on the bit lengths of the plaintext and the generated random number, we would like to point out that the message size in homomorphic encryption is 2048 bits, which should be large enough to mask the routes securely. This should not affect the communication overhead because the ciphertext size does not depend on the plaintext size.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The closest work to ours is in [7] , in which vehicles report their routes anonymously by promising the authority to pass by certain segments. Anonymous authentication is used to preserve the location privacy by hiding real identities. However, since the authority can access the routes of the individual drivers, it can use timing-based correlations to link the route reports from one driver and reconstruct the travel path to uncover the driver identity from the visited locations. To address this issue, the authors require each driver to seize reporting the routes for a while, something that will negatively affect the performance of the traffic management system. Our proposed schemes, on the other hand, do not allow all TMCs to access the routes of individual drivers; instead, we aggregate the routes to provide the TMC with the total number of vehicles planning to drive in each segment. This information should suffice for traffic flow optimization. In addition, the scheme of [7] is limited to only infrastructure-based VANETs and does not handle selforganizing VANETs. Moreover, we study collusion attacks that are not addressed in [7] .
In infrastructure-based schemes, Zhang et al. [24] proposed a privacy-preserving vehicle location proofs scheme. Vehicles prove their location claims by receiving VProof packets from distributed RSUs along the road. An RSU uses symmetric encryption and hash function to compose the VProof packet. The vehicles use these packets later as a proof to the intelligent transportation system operator to report any traffic data.
In self-organizing VANETs, Milojevic et al. [25] proposed a scheme to detect and quantify traffic congestion. Vehicles compare their current speed to a congestion threshold and calculate a congestion-level value. Kitani et al. [26] proposed a scheme to collect traffic information from the neighboring vehicles. Vehicles ask routine-run vehicles (such as public buses) about certain areas of interest, and they get a reply if there is available traffic information about these areas. Leontiadis et al. [27] built a model to study the effect of disseminating traffic information in VANETs. The vehicles broadcast traffic information to other vehicles to enable them to decide whether to stay in their route or change it. The model uses computerassisted traveling environment to determine the current status of the road, i.e., lightly traveled or congested. Wischhof et al. [28] proposed a segment-oriented data abstraction and dissemination to disseminate nonsafety traffic information in VANETs. The scheme has two phases. In map-based data abstraction phase, vehicles receive traffic information about segments on the road. In the data dissemination phase, vehicles broadcast the most recent information about segments to all neighboring vehicles. Calabrese et al. [29] utilizes cellular networks to provide real-time urban monitoring system such as traffic conditions and pedestrians movement. In this system, traffic maps are generated based on anonymous monitoring of probes of mobile equipment. However, the aforementioned schemes do not address the privacy of users.
IX. CONCLUSION
Reporting current and future routes of vehicles helps traffic management systems to alleviate and prevent congestion, yet it degrades drivers' privacy. In this paper, we have proposed privacy-preserving route reporting schemes for infrastructuresupported and self-organizing VANETs. The main idea is to employ data aggregation techniques so that vehicles are able to report their future routes without leaking any private information. Homomorphic encryption and ECC point addition are used to hide and aggregate the vehicles' routes. In the case of self-organizing VANETs, our proposed schemes not only preserve the drivers' privacy but protect against the notorious collusion attack as well. Analysis and extensive evaluations and ns-2 simulation results have demonstrated that the proposed schemes can preserve the privacy of vehicles with acceptable communication and computation overhead.
